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Engineering ethics:Ontology and politics 
Eddie Conlon 
Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland 
Edward.conlon@dit.ie 
Abstract:  “Ontology...acts as both gatekeeper and bouncer for methodology” 
(Archer 1995: 22). This exploratory paper, through a focus on the relationship 
between structure and agency, examines the underlying social ontologies 
informing the teaching, and researching of the teaching, of engineering ethics. It 
argues that current approaches are deficient and that Critical Realism can 
provide the basis for a more robust and inclusive research agenda for 
understanding engineering practice and  the teaching of engineering ethics. 
Introduction 
The relationship between human action (agency) and society (structure) lies at the heart of 
much social theorising (Archer 1995). In this paper I explore the teaching of engineering 
ethics (EE) through the lens of this relationship.  I do this on order to draw out the underlying 
social ontologies informing approaches to this subject. The argument is simply that how we 
see EE will inform our approach to researching it.  It will inform the questions we ask and the 
kinds of explanations developed to evaluate the integration of ethics teaching in engineering 
education. First, I outline a recent experience in participating in a survey of ethics educators 
in order to discuss the predominant approach to ethics teaching which is focused on the 
actions of individuals. I then explore some alternative approaches to argue firstly, that the 
focus in the literature on the need to integrate macro issues does not necessarily allow for an 
adequate integration of agency/structure relations in inderstanding ethical issues, and 
secondly, that some macro approaches effectively eliminate the possibility for ethical 
reflection by engineers. Finally, drawing on Critical Realism (CR) and the work of Margaret 
Archer, I argue that current approaches suffer from various form of conflationism and that CR 
can provide the basis for a fuller integration of agency/structure relations in ethics teaching. It 
can also inform a research agenda which extends beyond the evaluation of the extent to 
which we prepare our students to resolve ethical dilemmas. In doing this I realise there is 
much debate in sociology about how to conceptualise the social structure and the relative 
importance given to cultural patterns and systems of social relations, which provide 
differential access to power and resources, in these conceptualisations (Porpora 1989). 
Space prevents full consideration of the issues here as my main focus is on the manner in 
which action is linked to the wider social environment broadly defined.  However a 
supplementary argument is that when EE does attempt to incorporate the wider context the 
focus is often on culture rather than on social relations of power. 
The Individualistic Approach 
This paper was prompted by my participation in a recent international survey of EE teaching 
conducted by the Japanese Society for Engineering Education (JSEE). In the accompanying 
Learning and Educational Objectives of Engineering Ethics Education we find a strong 
commitment to what I have previously called the individualistic approach to EE teaching (see 
Conlon and Zandvoort  2010). The document states that the "the final goal of engineering 
ethics education should be to foster qualities and abilities that enable…engineers to make 
self-reliant/autonomous decisions and act according to their decisions as professionals." It 
says that ethics education should develop the “Ability (i) to examine solutions from multiple 
viewpoints including resolving ethical dilemmas and demonstrating consideration to 
stakeholders' concerns and (ii) to determine the best solution plan applying comparative 
evaluation of options”.  The document demonstrates a commitment to the individualistic 
approach.  This approach uses case studies to focus on the resolution of ethical dilemmas by 
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individual engineers. These often involve clashes between engineers and managers and 
focus on the capacity of engineers to resist managerial pressures.  The approach draws on 
moral philosophy and codes of ethics as the basis of ethical decision making.  It assumes 
that not only can ethical problems be solved at the level of the individual but that engineers 
can act on their solutions.  This approach frames the research questions in the Japanese 
research which focus mainly the importance of values, attitudes, reponsibilities and problem 
solving.  This is somewhat problematic in that while this approach seems to be the dominant 
form of ethics teaching (see Hess 2013, Colby and Sullivan 2008) many have called for 
alternative approaches which focus on the realities of engineering practice, the broad goals 
of engineering, policy issues and institutional arrangements which affect the practice of 
engineering (see Conlon 2011).  
While there are references to the wider society in places on balance the document is focused 
on the individual engineer.  By ignoring the structural context in which engineering takes 
place this approach leads to moralism as unrealistic expectations are placed on individual 
engineers (Swiestra and Jelsma 2006). The adoption of the individual approach by JSEE is 
even more surprising given that Shibata (2011) has argued that: “The most Japanese 
engineers belong to private firms. As a result, they cannot act individually and be an 
independent professional…Individual engineer’s ethics, in other words micro-level 
engineering ethics, do not always work effectively for all Japanese engineers.” (161) 
But that is not the only problem. The JSEE document also states that the attitudes and 
values required of engineers " is neither to force nor to deny particular values, attitudes, or 
ideology on to engineers. Instead, it is intended to clarify and emphasize the role of 
engineering ethics education while maintaining respect for the diversity and the individuality 
of values, and to encourage learners to make autonomous decisions while remaining aware 
of their responsibilities and roles."  This is a call for value neutrality and is based on the 
contradiction that while we want engineers to practice engineering ethically we do not seem 
to want them to commit to any particular set of values. Engineers are to strive for “creative 
middle ground” (Harris et al. 2009) solutions and EE teachers are to avoid preaching 
(Pfatteicher 2013).  There would seem to be an assumption that not only are creative middle 
ground solutions desirable but also that they are attainable (in that the needs of all parties 
can be met) and implementable. 
This commitment to political neutrality, the focus on the individual engineer and the 
bracketing out of the wider context are linked.  The case study approach to EE “tend to focus 
upon relatively rare, narrowly bounded crises … (The) contexts that underlie particular cases 
are never themselves called into question” (Winner 1990: 53-54).  The assumption is that “as 
one enters a profession, one simply embraces the existing commitments, institutional 
patterns, and power relationships” (56). Thus this approach does not lead to the questioning 
of the wider purpose of engineering or the role of engineers in reproducing power relations 
and patterns of privilege in society. They are not encouraged to reflect on whose interests 
they serve as they practice engineering. Thus there is a crucial link between the ontological 
assumption that EE teaching should focus narrowly on the practice of individual engineers 
and the political assumption that ethical dilemmas can be resolved at this level without 
changing the context in which engineers work. 
Responsible Engineers 
The defense of the individual approach focuses on the “moral accountability of individual 
engineers” (Harris et al. 2009: 23) and the issue of responsibility (Davis 2006, 2012). Indeed 
codes of ethics, which play a central role in the individual approach, are essentially 
“standards of responsibility” (Harris et al. 2009:25).  Davis opposes the tendency, as he sees 
it, of social theorists to eliminate the need to explain individual decision making by falling 
back on “social forces” to relieve engineers of moral reponsibility for what they do. He claims 
engineers have the capacity to be morally reponsible and can be held individually reponsible 
for their actions.  EE should help “engineers to take their professional responsibilities to 
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heart” (Swiestra and Jelsma 2006: 310) As a result, those using the indvidual approach tend 
to focus on individual failings as the key impediments to responsible action. Harris et al. 
(2009: 37-43) list impediments such as self-interest, self-deception, fear, ignorance, 
egocentric tendencies, microscopic vision and uncritical acceptance of authority. They 
identify one barrier which focuses on group processes, which is groupthink, but see it as a 
problem arising from the needs of individuals for high interpersonal cohesiveness rather than 
the outcome of an exercise of power (see Edward and Wajcman 2005). 
There are two main problems with this focus on individual reponsibility. One is that the 
practice of engineering involves collective activity and secondly, the conditions for assuming 
moral reponsibility by individual engineers do not always exist (Swiestra and Jelsma 2006, 
see also Coeckelbergh 2006 and van de Poel and Fahlquist 2013).  It is argued that the 
conditions (moral agency; causality; free will and knowledge of consequences) for assuming 
moral responsibility rarely exist in engineering practice. One particular problem is what is 
referred to as the “problem of many hands” in that engineers are just one of many actors 
involved in complex organisational and technical processes. Further, the freedom of 
engineers is restricted in that they typically work in “hierarchical organisations and have little 
room to follow their own choices” (Swiestra and Jelsma 2006: 314). This refers to what is 
known as the captivity of engineering to corporate and managerial agendas (Conlon 2013). 
Davis (2012) is somewhat dismissive of this idea in that he argues that engineers can break 
off their association with their employer at any time just by giving notice. There are many 
problems with this rather naive view of the employment relationship.  From the perspective of 
engineering practices it might mean that even if the engineer breaks off their association with 
their employer this may not lead to questionable or unethical pratices stopping. It can be 
noted, in this context, that Davis’s discussion of the rationale for whistleblowing is focused on 
the need for individual engineers to avoid complicity in doing harm rather than that stated by 
de George, which is to avoid harm (see Harris et al. 2009). Thus one can assume that if the 
individual engineer is not complicit then it may be okay not to blow the whistle on harmful 
activities.  
The decision to view a risk as an individual or collective matter entails different strategies for 
dealing with risk reduction (van de Poel and Fahlquist 2013). This is why some have called 
for a focus on institutional ethics rather than individual ethics. Underlying this work is the 
recognition that “If the engineers claim for safety have to survive in a context dominated by 
competition for money and power, regulation with an ethical content may be the engineers 
life jacket” (Coeckelbergh 2006: 250, see also Zandvoort 2005). 
Macro/ Micro or Structure/Agency 
This call for a focus on institutional ethics is one of a wide variety of proposals to refocus the 
teaching of EE. I have previously (Conlon 2011) tried to map out these approaches and their 
relationship with the individualistic approach by focusing on the call for the integration of 
macro issues into EE (Hekert 2005).  This exercise was useful in helping to delineate the 
differences in approaches to EE teaching  but it also highlighted the limitations in the call for 
a macro approach, in that this call may focus solely on the “macro subjective” dimension by 
focusing on the collective goals and culture of engineering without taking adequate account 
of “macro objective” factors, such as power relations, which shape the institutional 
environment of engineers. 
For example, Bowen (2009 ), who is critical of the individualistic approach, calls for an 
aspirational ethics and a focus on the aims of engineering.  He argues for the promotion of 
human flourishing, that engineers have not engaged sufficiently in ethical analysis of their 
activities and they need to take responsibility for the outcomes of their activities. An 
aspirational approach will stimulate a change so as to promote the personal ethical 
responsibility of every engineer. A person who “genuinely possesses a virtue would be 
expected to manifest it through the range of his or her activities” (p.79). Bowen’s approach is 
useful in reminding engineers of the importance of prioritising needs. But it not clear that he 
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offers a clear path to address the failure to prioritise human need as he does not adequately 
take account of the specifically capitalist context in which much most engineering takes place 
and its tendency to commodify all social relations such that they become purely instrumental 
(Moriarity 2008 ). There is no discussion of power in Bowen and no engagement with the 
captivity of engineering. The main emphasis for Bowen is on the culture of engineering and 
the development of an aspirational ethos amongst engineers.  His emphasis is on the 
collective goals of the profession (a macro issue) but not necessarily on the structural context 
in which engineers work. His approach remains focused on the agency of engineers. 
The other problem with the macro/micro distinction is it is not always easy to distinguish the 
micro from the macro as they are intertwined and depend on each other (Layder 2006). 
Herkert (2005) has, for example, identified the design of safe products as a micro issue. But 
the safety of engineering products and processes is affected by the attitudes, practices and 
organisation of engineers, organisational structures and culture, the regulatory regime, 
production pressures and public policy, which includes policy on product liability which 
Herkert identifies as a macro issue. It would seem then that the key issue is not just the scale 
of the issues which EE teaching addresses but how different mechanisms come together to 
produce particular effects on the practice of engineering. This involves looking at how the 
practices of engineers impact on and are impacted by their social environment. This calls for 
a more sociological approach to understanding engineering practice. But this call is not 
unproblematic. Davis (2006) argues that sociological approaches to EE tend to make 
decisions seem inevitable as events are seen as linked by social forces rather than by 
individual decisions.  And there is validity to this critique as some forms of sociological 
explanation treat humans as oversocialised “cultural dopes” who merely manifest the 
demands of their society. If actions are determined at this level then all ethical issues are 
diluted as human resistance and intervention become futile (Reed 2005: 296). 
The Challenger Challenged 
There is a tendency to such an approach in the much praised account of the Challenger 
Disaster by Diane Vaughan (1996). Her approach is seen by some to offer the basis for a 
clear alternative to the individual approach in its focus on the practice of engineers and the 
organisational and cultural context of that practice (see Bucciarelli 2008 and Lynch and Kline 
2000). In explaining the disaster she emphasises institutional logics and the manner in which 
patterns of behaviour developed and became institutionalised within the organisations 
supporting the Shuttle programme. 
Vaughan discusses how risk came to be redefined, leading to a number of  launches with a 
flawed design and the “normalisation of deviance”.  She highlights the wider economic and 
political environment in which NASA operated and the way it contributed to the the 
normalisation of deviance.  Changes in NASA’s budgetary environment meant that 
“schedule, budget, following rules and procedures, and allegiance to hierarchy displaced 
safety and deference to the expertise of working engineers” (Vaughan 2008: 74). Thus she 
not only focuses on the organisation and work groups but at the relationship between the 
culture of the workgroup and the wider economic and political environment. She is sceptical 
about the possibilities for organisational reform which does not take account of this wider 
environment (1996:415-22).  
While being a useful corrective to the focus on individual engineers this seems to argue for 
too neat a fit between the wider culture, the organisational culture and the behavior of 
individuals. As she says: “The NASA case showed how sets of organizing assumptions 
institutionalized in the organization field trickled down through layered structures…shaping 
individual cognitive processes and actions... At the micro-level, they created a way of seeing 
composed of shared understandings about risk, how the work should be done, and the 
criteria for decision making” (Vaughan 2008: 74). 
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What is significant, for the argument being developed here, is that Vaughan’s account draws 
on particular theoretical approaches, new institutionalism and Bourdieu’s concepy of habitus  
(Vaughan 2008), which tend to emphasis the determing role of social structures at the 
expense of human agency. At the most general level Vaughan relies on new institutionalism 
to argue that the institutional context gave rise to a culture of production that led to a 
defective decision making process (Feldman 2000). Her use of this approach leads to an 
emphasis on the integrating role of the organisational culture: the stress is on the unreflective 
and routine (see Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 10 and 14).  
This focus on the taken-for granted and unreflective nature of action  is reinforced by her use 
of habitus to demonstrate how the institutional forces in the organisational environment 
become embodied in the actions of the engineers. Habitus refers to the “set of dispositions 
inculcated in each of us by the conditioning that follows from our social environment” (Elder 
Vass 2007: 326). These dispositions are durable and shared by those holding similar 
positions in the social structure: the inculcation of a habitus leads to “the internalisation of the 
principles of the social structure” (Burawoy 2012: 190). Through the operation of habitus 
people’s practices are beyond conscious mastery and each of us “wittingly or unwittingly is a 
producer and reproducer of objective meaning” (Bourdieu 1977: 79). Proponents of new 
institutionalism have seen it as a key concept for linking macro social forces to behaviour “to 
explain why strategically orientated actors chronically reproduce and acquiesce to social 
structures that are not in their interest” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 26 emphasis added).  
Bourdieu developed the concept in an effort to overcome the opposition between 
structuralism and constructivism  (between society and the individual) in social theory. His 
focus is on practice and the dialectical relationship between agency and structure (Bourdieu 
1977). While he seeks to bridge the gap between structuralism and constructionism he has a 
bias in the direction of structuralism. This leads to two related problems. Firstly the notion of 
habitus leaves little room for human reflection and intentionality: habitus is merely a conveyor 
belt for the determination of action by social forces (Elder Vass 2007). His model of practice 
“turns out to be a celebration of mindless conformity ” (Jenkins 2002: 97). This leads to the 
second problem in that if there is no room for agency there is little possibility of change, 
protest or resistance (Jenkins 2002, Buroway 2012).  
It is no surprise then that Freeland (1997) claims that Vaughan veers too far towards an 
“oversocialised” conception of action “in which actors passively reproduce learned cultural 
scripts” (131). A key criticism of her account is in focusing on the institutional culture she 
neglects the issue of power: “she replaces the study of conflict with a notion of totalising and 
unconscious institutional forces” (Feldman 2000: 476, see also Perrow 1996). In fact the 
launch decision, which led to the disaster, took place under unprecedented cold conditions 
outside parameters that had not been previously investigated. Thus it was not normal. If 
universal macro forces were dominant disagreement could not have arisen. The launch was 
opposed by a group of engineers who knew it was outside normal parameters, rather than 
being embedded in an unquestioned culture (Edwards and Wajman 2005). In effect she is 
offering a particular kind of sociological explanation, with the emphasis on the organisational 
culture, which does not take adequate acount of the capacity of people to challenge 
dominant cultural scripts.     
But this is not the only kind of sociological explanation.  Some social theory has sought to 
deal with the question of human agency and the manner in which actors develop the capacity 
to influence their environment. It is the case that human choice is restricted and confined by 
social and cultural structures. But these structures can be changed to enable actors to have 
greater choice.  Archer has argued that the key issue facing social theory is to develop 
frameworks that specify the conditions “under which agents have greater degrees of freedom 
or work under a considerable stringency of constraint” (Archer 2000:6)  Archer is a proponent 
of critical realism (CR) who has sought to provide an account of the agency structure 
relationship which takes account of a properly argued view of both and the relationship 
between them (Scott 2000). This can provide the basis for a more robust and inclusive 
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agenda for undestanding engineering practice (Kotta 2011), the teaching of EE and  the 
researching of that teaching.  
Critical Realism 
CR has emerged as an alternative paradigm in the social sciences to positivism and 
interpretivism. It combines a realist ontology with an interpretive epistemology: the real world 
exists independently of our knowledge of it and our knowledge of the world is always fallible 
as it is shaped by the “social position of knowers and theories on which they draw” (Carter 
and New 2004: 2). CR argues for the primacy of ontology  but also that the “nature of what 
exists cannot be unrelated to how it is studied…the social ontology endorsed … 
conceptualises social reality in certain terms, thus identifying what there is to be explained” 
(Archer 1995 pp. 16-17). Thus what society is held to be, including how we undertand the 
relationship between structure and action, affects how it is studied and what constitutes 
“explanatory purchase on substantive social problems” (12). 
In seeking to explain social phenomena CR offers a distinctive approach (Scott 2007, Carter 
and New 2004). It is not possible to deal with all aspects of it here but two issues are 
important for the purposes of this paper. Firstly, CR offers a depth ontology: a notion of a 
stratified reality which includes a distinction between the domain of the real (generative 
mechanisms), the actual (events) and the empirical (experiences). Structures of objects at 
the level of the real generate mechanisms that facilitate events.  CR focuses on the 
identification of these mechanisms as causal factors explaining social phenomena. This is 
potentially emancipatory in that it forces us to consider “that certain states of affairs cannot 
be ameliorated within existing structures”.(Collier 1994: 10). They must be changed. 
Secondly, structures are described as generative mechanisms, because when their powers 
are realised they work to make things happen. Their activation is dependent on human 
agents. CR is committed to an explanatory model “in which the interplay between pre-
existent structures, possessing causal powers…and people possessing causal powers…of 
their own results in contingent yet explicable outcomes” (Carter and New 2004: 6). This 
implies that any investigation can only take place “at the intersection...of agential and 
structural objects” (Scott 2007:15). Archer (1995) argues that social theory has come up with 
unsatisfactory ways to understand this relationship and she provides a framework for 
understanding different approaches by focusing on what she calls varieties of conflationism. 
On the one hand there is downward conflation which emphasis the determining effect of 
social structures and allows very little role for intentional human activity in explaining social 
forms. On the other hand there is upward conflation which places undue emphasis on the 
creative and intentional  dimension of human activity and downplays “the way human beings 
are both immersed in and constrained by the way society is constructed” (Scott 2000: 28). 
She identifies a third kind of central conflationism, evident in the work of Bourdieu and the 
sociologist Anthony Giddens, which see agency and structure as “mutually constitutive” and 
fundamentally inseparable. Structures are instantiated in social practices and are not seen as 
constituting externalised entities that constrain agency in various ways. Thus structure is 
collapsed into agency and their properties cannot be examined separately. Both are 
redefined as “inseparable aspects of a flattened social ontology” (Reed 2005: 296). 
What CR seeks to do is to avoid these positions and to take account of a properly argued 
view of both agency and structure (and culture) and the relationship between them. CR is 
committed to analytical dualism in that structure and agency are seen as objects of a 
radically different type  possessing different properties and powers (Carter and New 2004).  
For the latter these include self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, cognition and 
emotionality. The key properties of social structures are anteriority (they are pre-existing 
features of the world we are born into) and that they are relatively enduring.  Among the 
powers possessed by social structures are those of enablement and constraint. 
One consequence of this is that actors are capable of reflection and can formulate  
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commitments and develop normative projects as a consequence of their deliberations upon 
their social situation. Contra Bourdieu those in similar social situations may develop diverse 
subjectivities (Elder Vass 2007). But we do not do this in circumstances of our own choosing. 
“People choose what they do, but they make their choices from a structurally and culturally 
determined range of options – which they do not choose” (Carter and New 2004: 3).  As seen 
above structures predates agency. While structure are dependent on activity those actions 
that produce a given structure may be those of a past generation. Once these differential 
temporalities of structure and agency are taken into account the close bond between the two, 
as argued for by central conflationists, is loosened up (Callinicos 2006) and it becomes 
necessary to differentiate the two and examine their interplay. In order to do so, and to 
provide concrete methodological form to the analysis of the interplay between structure and 
agency, Archer (1995) has proposed her morphogenetic model of explanation which works 
on the basis of a three part cycle of analysis ( she proposes a similar approach to the 
analysis of culture): 
a) Structural conditioning: pre-existence structures as generative mechanisms that condition 
but do not determine; 
b) Social interaction: their interplay with other objects including agents possessing causal 
powers leading to 
c) Structural elaboration or modification: non-predictable but explicable outcomes arising 
from the interactions between the above. 
The model allows us to focus on the interplay between structure and agency and the 
possibility of change arising from social interactions. This arises because agents can 
formulate projects for change and structures can provide them with the power to carry them 
through. Thus the tranformative potential inherent in human agency can only “begin to bite 
when structural contexts ...are generally supportive of those potentialities being actualised in 
some durable form.” (Reed 2005: 302). Thus transformation is dependent both on a 
commitment to change and the capacity to carry it through. 
CR and Ethics Education 
From the perspective of EE education this approach would seem to have a number of 
advantages. It avoids the conflationism evidenced in the approaches to EE outlined above. 
The individualistic approach and that of Bowen are forms of upward conflationism as they 
focus on the agency of engineers while the analysis of Vaughan suffers from downward 
conflationism in emphasising the integrating effects of the institutional culture. These 
approaches are also problematical in that in focusing, on the one hand, on decontextualised 
individuals and, on the other, the all-encompassing power of institutional logics, they either 
do not see the need for institutional change or render engineers powerless in bringing about 
change. Either there is no need for change or no chance of bringing it about. 
It can be noted also that while some have called for a greater integration of STS into the 
study of EE (Johnson and Wetmore 2007) it has been argued that approaches to 
understanding technology and organisations associated with STS are characterised by a flat 
ontology associated with central conflationism and pay inadequate attention to the need to 
distinguish between different levels or forms of analysis in that they tend to focus on the 
domain of the empirical and the processal character of social reality (Elder Vass 2008, Klein 
and Kleinman 2002, Reed 1997). These approaches pay inadequate attention to the 
structural dimension of social interactions with debilitating explanatory and political 
consequences including the failure of STS scholarship to commit to explicitly normative 
analysis (see Johnson and Wetmore 2007). 
CR encourages us to examine ethical issues in a manner which focus on underlying 
generative mechanisms and their impacts on engineering practice. For example, in analysing 
safety and accidents the focus would shift from operator error and the negligence of 
engineers to the organisational and historical contexts which “generate a pre-accident 
situation, long before the occurrence of the initiating event and the triggering of the accident 
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sequence.” (Dien et al. 2004, see Kotta 2011). In this context a key issue is the extent to 
which dominant views are contestable (Edwards and Wajman 2005) and the manner to 
which engineers are enabled to contest dominant views. Thus the promotion of an 
institutional ethics is useful, but does not resolve all issues in that regulation has to be fought 
for and implemented (Coeckelbergh 2006). Thus we are required to examine the 
interventions of engineers in the public policy domain and how they contribute to the 
structural conditioning of engineering practice and whether the resulting laws, regulation and 
practices contribute to structural elaboration or modification. By attempting to identify the 
structural and material preconditions for successful interventions in the world a CR approach 
can put us in a better position to promote ethical engineering. It also requires us to abandon 
value neutrality and identify the features of the social structure which need to change in order 
to facilitate engineering practices which promote safety, sustainability and social justice. 
This has important implications for the questions we ask and the methods we use in order to 
understand educational practices. In effect CR calls us on to redefine the nature of EE and 
what we should look for in seeking to evaluate the extent to which our students are educated 
to be socially responsible engineers. The approach outlined above would shift from trying to 
evaluate the teaching of moral reasoning and a narrow focus on values and attitudes to a 
concern with the integration in engineering programmes of social and institutional context of 
engineers work and the role of engineers in promoting policy changes that enable social 
responsibility. This would require a focus on the use of history, politics and social theory in 
engineering programmes and the manner in which the broad focus being advocated here 
could be facilitated. In considering the fuller integration of the social sciences into 
engineering education a CR approach would shift the focus for educational change from 
individual educators to academic cultures and organisational processes and force us to ask 
questions about the “paradox of increasing innovation in engineering curricula coupled with a 
lack of diffusion of such innovation” (Spalter-Roth and Meiksins 2008). It is only by identifying 
the structures at work in the domain of the real that we can fully understand what needs to 
change in engineering education. 
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